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NOTE
EVIDENCE
PROBLEMS RELATING TO ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE CHALLENGED AS INDIRECT RESULT
OF ILLEGAL SEARCH
Krulewitch was indicted on charges of violating and
conspiring to violate the Federal White Slave Traffic Act.
The trial court granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search of his apartment. At the
trial defense counsel objected to admission of certain additional items of evidence on the ground that they were the
result of clues obtained in the illegal search. So far as
appears, defense counsel did not offer any testimony to
support his objections. Upon assurance by the prosecuting
attorney at each objection that the offered evidence had an
origin independent of the illegal search, the trial court overruled the objections. From a conviction Krulewitch appealed, assigning as error, inter alia, that the trial court before admitting the challenged evidence failed to take testimony as to its origin. The circuit court of appeals affirmed,
lolding that under the circumstances the trial court's action
did not amount to an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
The case suggests an inquiry into several of the problems which confront a trial court when evidence is objected
to on the ground that it is derived from evidence or clues
already established to have been directly obtained by illegal
means.' Chief among these problems is the question as to
1.

The inquiry is relevant, of course, only in the federal courts and
in that substantial number of state courts where it is held that,
subject to certain exceptions, evidence obtained by illegal means
is not admissible against the accused in a criminal trial. The
common law rule of evidence is that its admissibility is not affected by the illegality of the means through which it is procured. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904); 8 WIGmORE,
EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25
COL. L. REv. 11 (1925). The trend seems to be toward inadmissibility. See Notes, 88 A. L. R. 348 (1934) and 52 A. L. R. 477
(1928). The rule of inadmissibility has its roots in the soil of
the Bill of Rights. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 (1925). The rule flourished particularly during the Prohibition Era when unlawful searches of the property of suspected
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who bears the burden of proof on the issue of derivative
taint.
It fell to the second Nardone case 2 to enunciate fully the
expansion of the rule against the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence to exclude also evidence which, though
not directly obtained by illegal means, is derived from information secured by the illegal act.3 In the course of that
opinion the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
made some broad and general observations apparently intended for the guidance of trial courts in dealing with objections to evidence on the ground of derivative taint. The
Court said that the burden is on the accused in the first
instance to prove that illegal means have been resorted to
by the prosecution. 4 When that has been done, the trial
court must give to the accused opportunity, "however closely
confined," to prove that "a substantial portion of the case
against him is a fruit of the poisonous tree," leaving "ample
opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court
that its proof had an independent origin." 5 The Court
then qualified these observations by stating that a trial
court need not entertain any such objection unless satisfied
with its timeliness. 6 Nor, it was said, need the trial court
violators of the Volstead Act, with accompanying seizures of
articles of evidentiary value, were commonplace. See Fairchild,
Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 25 MARQ. L.
REV. 13, 14 (1940); Note, 42 ILL. L. REV. 822 (1948). Indiana
has adopted the inadmissibility rule. Shuck v. State, 223 Ind.
155, 59 N. E.2d 124 (1945); Smith v. State, 202 Ind. 684, 177
N. E. 898 (1931); Dumas v. State, 197 Ind. 123, 150 N. E. 24
(1925); Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N. E. 353 (1923); Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 138 N. E. 817 (1922). See Gilliom,
Searches and Seizures in the Administration of the Criminal Law
of Indiana, 1 IND. L. J. 65 (1926).
2. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939).
3. The expansion of the rule had previously been established. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920);
Watson v. United States, 6 F.2d 870 (C. C. A. 3d 1925); Flum
v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N. E. 353 (1923)."
4. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). This rule
had also previously been established. United States v. Phillips,
34 F.2d 495 (App. D. C. 1929); Samson v. United States, 26 F.2d
769 (C. C. A. 1st 1928). See Gilliom, supra note 1, at 72.
5. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939).
6. Id. at 341, 342. Subject to the exceptions noted below, the general
rule in the federal courts is that such an objection, in order to
satisfy the requirement of timeliness, must be made before trial
in the form of a motion to suppress. Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United
States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920); Dunn v. United States, 98 F.2d 119
(C. C. A. 10th 1938); United States v. Wernecke, 138 F.2d 561
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sustain the objection unless satisfied with the "solidity" of
the accused's claim of taint.7 Finally, the Court recognized
that such "rules" are not capable of being mechanically applied, but leave to the trial court "a well-established range
of judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal."8
Since the second Nardone case there has been little
judicial comment on the application of the propositions there
laid down. Only two cases seem to bear directly on the problem of burden of proof.
In United States v. Goldstein0 the trial court admitted
evidence over objection by accused that it had been derived
from illegal "wire tapping" already established to have been
committed by Government agents. On appeal the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the doctrine of the second
Nardone case in some detail and interpreted it as placing
(C. C. A. 7th 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 771 (1944).
See
Arnold, Search and Seizure Problems, 16 TENN. L. Ruv. 291, 301
(1940). The rule is subject to two exceptions. First, objection
at trial is timely if defendant did not previously have knowledge
that the evidence would be offered. Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921). See Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CORN. L. Q. 514, 522 (1947).
Second, if the offered
evidence is patently and admittedly illegally obtained, objection
at trial is not too late. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
34 (1925). See Rosenzweig, supra; Note, 1 U. OF CI. L. REV.
120, 123 (1933). The federal courts have in other ways shown
a tendency to relax the general rule. Amos v. United States,
255 U. S. 313 (1921). See United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 820
(C. C. A. 2d 1947), aff'd, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); FED. R. CRim. P.,
41 (e); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of
Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 489 (1948). There
is a sharp conflict of authority in the state courts, some of them
refusing to follow the general federal rule and holding that objection is timely when made at trial. Youman v. Commonwealth,
189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920). For collected cases see
Notes, 24 A. L. R. 1408 (1923), 32 A. L. R. 413 (1924), 41 A. L. R.
1149 (1926), 52 A. L. R. 483 (1928), 88 A. L. R. 359 (1934),
134 A. L. R. 826 (1941), 150 A. L. R. 573 (1944). Although
the law in Indiana on timeliness is not entirely clear, it seems
probable that Indiana, contra to the federal rule, now holds that
objection is timely when made at trial. Shuck v. State, 223 Ind.
155, 59 N. E.2d 124 (1945); KarIen v. State, 204 Ind. 146, 174
N. E. 89 (1930). See Heyvert v. State, 207 Ind. 654, 656, 194
N. E. 324, 325 (1935). "
7. ". . . mischief would result were tenuous claims sufficient to
justify the trial court's indulgence of inquiry into the legitimacy
of evidence in the Government's possession ....
Therefore claims
that taint attaches to any portion of the Government's case must
satisfy the trial court with their solidity . . . ." Nardone v.
United States, 308 U. S. 338, 342 (1939).
8. Ibid.
9. 120 F.2d 485 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
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upon the prosecution the burden of proof on *the issue of
derivative taint. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the
court, clearly indicated that failure to place the burden there
would ordinarily constitute reversible error. 0
On certiorari to the Supreme Court" the majority
opinion expressly reserved the question of burden of proof
as unnecessary to decision.1 In the dissenting opinion, however, Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for himself, Stone, C.J.,
and Frankfurter, J., treated the subject at length and ratified the construction put upon the Nardone doctrine by the
lower court. 3
The only other judicial interpretation of the doctrine
lies in the second Nardone case itself when remanded to the
district court. There the court, "following the direction of
the Supreme Court on ... appeal," held a preliminary hear-

ing in which the prosecution accepted the burden of proving
that none of the evidence which it proposed to use, and
which it later did use, had been 4the result of leads from
the illegally obtained information.'

Thus, though the Supreme Court has not directly passed
upon the question, there is respectable authority that the
"burden of proof" does devolve upon the prosecution.' 5 The
precise nature of this burden and the chronological point
at which it arises are subjects yet to be investigated. But
assuming an illegal procurement of some evidence by the
prosecution to -have been established, it is clear that this
10.

Id. at 488. Conviction was, however, affirmed on the ground that
since defendant was not a party to the "tapped" conversations,

he had no standing to object to the evidence.
11.
12.

Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114 (1942).
Id. at 117.

13. After stating that the trial judge had erroneously put the burden
on the accused, Justice Murphy continues: "For after an accused

sustains the initial burden, imposed by Nardone v. United States,
308 U. S. 338, of proving to the satisfaction of the trial judge
in the preliminary hearing that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed, as petitioners did here, it is only fair that the burden should
then shift to the Government to convince the trial judge that its
proof had an independent origin." Goldstein v. United States, 316
14.
15.

U. S. 114, 124, n. 1 (1942). The dissent then quotes with approval
Judge Learned Hand's language in the court below. Ibid.
See United States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
This conclusion has also been recommended elsewhere: "It would

be reasonable to expect that in such cases the burden should be
on the prosecution to show that the evidence was not obtained
through the information learned as a result of the illegal search."
Atkinson, supra note 1, at 25,
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fact alone does not make the prosecution's entire case prima
facie inadmissible. Defendant's objection to the evidence
he seeks to suppress must be timely. Presumably he must
first satisfy the court on this score before any such objection
need even be the subject of an inquiry. In addition there
is imposed another duty on the accused if he is to support
his claim of taint. He must, in the words of Judge Hand,
show "some use" of the illegal activity. 16 Or to translate
this language into general terms, it is a fair statement that
he must show a probable, or at least a possible, causal connection between the illegal activity and the evidence sought
17
to be suppressed.
So despite judicial utterances to the effect that the
burden is on the prosecution to show thdt its proof had aii
independent origin, it is manifest that whatever burden
is eventually to be borne by the prosecution does not arise
at the moment of objection. Serious obstacles must first
be overcome by the defendant.
Assuming the accused to have satisfied these two primary requirements, either by process of logical argument
or by the introduction of evidence,"' what can be said as to
the subsequent procedure? It seems fairly certain, in the
present state of the law, that the prosecution must now
come forward with some evidence.
The exact nature of the duty falling upon the prosecution at this point is open to debate. One defensible definition of the term "burden of proof" is that it amounts to a
duty to establish a fact in issue by a preponderance of the
16.

United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
Compare the language of the second Nardone case, to the effect
that defendant's claim must have "solidity." See note 7 supra.
17. This interpretation is supported by another statement by Judge
Hand in the same opinion: ". . . after the accused had proved
that the 'taps' had been made and had to some extent been used
to break down Messman and to a less degree Garrow [two witnesses who the defense contended were induced to testify for
the prosecution upon being confronted with the "taps"], the
burden fell upon the prosecution." United States v. Goldstein, 120
F.2d 485, 488 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
18. It seems fairly clear that the trial court must allow the accused
to introduce at least a limited amount of extrinsic evidence to
establish the "solidity" of his claim of taint. Nardone v. United
States, 308 U. S. 338, esp. 341 (1939). This statement should be
qualified, however, in the case of repeated but subsequently unsupported objections, the problem of which will be more fully
discussed inf!ra.
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If courts always used the term in this sense,

this phase of the inquiry could end here. However, "burden"
or "burden of proof" is quite often used to describe the

duty to proceed with the evidence.20

It is at least arguable

that the courts have used these terms in the latter sense in

relation to the instant problem.

If this is true, the duty

falling upon the prosecution *would, in theory at least, be
considerably less onerous than under the definition first
ventured above.21
It should be here noted, however, that this concern
with the nature of the prosecution's burden may be largely
an academic one. While from a substantive point of view
the law may require the judge to be cognizant of what in
theory the prosecution's duty is, at the same time it is apparent that in practice any subtle standard of the quantum
of evidence required of the prosecution would probably be
given lip service only. We are dealing with a collateral
hearing addressed to the judge on an issue for his decision

alone.2 2 The jury is not involved.2 3 Assuming some pro19.

This definition is often said to be the proper use of the term.
See Ray, Burden of Proof "andPresumptions, 13 TEx. L. REV. 33
(1935). Professor Wigmore's now classic description is "risk of
non-persuasion."

20.

recognized.

21.

22.

9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485.

The term "burden of proof" is notorious for its vacillating character and has long been a thorn in the side of courts and law
writers. Clarity of expression by its use, without more, often
cannot be attained. That the term has a double meaning is well
".

.

. it will not be necessary to repeat the distinction

•
between the burden of proof and the necessity of producing
evidence to meet that already produced. The distinction is now
very generally accepted, although often blurred by careless
speech." Mr. Justice Holmes in Hill v. Smith, 260 U. S. 592, 594
(1923).
See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2485, 2487; Ray, supra
note 19; Abbott, Two Burdens of Proof, 6 HARv. L. REV. 125
(1892).
Since defendant in the instant case apparently did not pass his
two preliminary hurdles, the court's holding was proper even
though the prosecution did not adequately shoulder a "burden"
in either sense of the term. "Defense counsel did no more than
to assert that the evidence was unlawfully obtained." United
States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943, 946 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
Steel v. United States, 267 U. S. 505, 510 (1925); Ford v. United
States, 273 U. S. 593, 605 (1927).
See 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §
2550: " . . . so far as the admissibility in law depends on some
incidental question of fact . . . this also is for the judge to deter-

23.

mine, before he admits the evidence to the jury." See also
Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1927);
Fraenkel, supra note 6, at 489.
One writer suggests it may be arguing in a vacuum to criticize
the application of rules of evidence, developed for the guidance of
a jury, to a preliminary question decided by the court. 34 MICH.
L. REV. 440, 441 (1936).
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bative evidence on both sides, a judge could allow his power
of discretion full sway; on review the appellate court could
not disturb his finding barring the familiar "clear abuse
24
of discretion."
Regardless of the precise character of the burden, there
can be little doubt, in view of the foregoing, that in the
federal courts the prosecution has at least a duty to proceed with the evidence after the accused has convinced the
trial court of the timeliness and substantiality of his objection.2 5

A second aspect of the problem of derivatively tainted
evidence requires some consideration. As stated in the second Nardone case, the causal connection between the illegal
act and the derived evidence "may have become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint." 2 In other words, even though
the lineage of a certain piece of evidence can be traced to
an illegal "ancestor," the evidence may nevertheless in some
instances be admitted as sufficiently legitimate. Of course
when the illegality is the sole means by which evidence is
obtained, that evidence will be excluded. But where it is
apparently the product of more than one cause, its status
becomes more difficult to determine. 27 The problem is not
24.
25.

26.

27.

"It would be difficult to imagine a situation in which the trial
court's attitude as to burden of proof on a preliminary question
could become significant upon review." Ibid.
There is some similarity between the instant problem and that
of the admissibility of confessions in those states which hold
that a confession is prima facie inadmissible. The states following
this rule of inadmissibility hold that if a confession is challenged,
the burden is on the prosecution to prove it voluntary. People
v. Boyce, 314 Mich. 608, 23 N. W.2d 99, 101 (1946); People v.
Ickes, 370 Ill. 486, 19 N. E.2d 373, 375 (1939). The courts are
split on this question, however, a majority apparently holding
as stated. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 860. A number of states,
including Indiana, follow the opposite rule, i.e., that a confession
is prima facie admissible, the burden being on the defendant to
prove it inadmissible. Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 277, 11 N. E.2d 171
(1937); Milbourn v. State, 212 Ind. 161, 8 N. E.2d 985 (1937);
Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N. E. 279 (1932).
Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). Compare
an earlier expression of the Court: "Of course this does not mean
that the facts thus [illegally] obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others. . . ." Silverthorne
Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920).
For example, suppose an accused's home is illegally searched by
officers acting for the prosecution. They seize a letter containing John Doe's name and address. But in addition to the letter
the prosecution has three other leads pointing to Doe as a possible witness. Should his testimony be excluded?
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capable of a pat solution, but it is suggested that the trial
judge may call to his aid certain rules which the courts have
created to govern other situations where one result seemingly
has several causes, e.g., the "substantial factor" test as it
relates to the doctrine of proximate cause in the law of
torts.2 8 But again it must be observed that such considerations will not usually appear on the surface of a trial judge's
decision and he should be held to account only for an abuse
of his discretion. 9
There is yet a third facet of the general problem of
admissibility of derivatively tainted evidence worthy of
mention. In the course of a criminal trial where once it
has been shown that evidence has been illegally obtained,
defense counsel might be greatly tempted to harass the prosecution and delay the trial with numerous plausible but unfounded objections to evidence on the ground of its being
derivatively tainted. Should the trial court, at the risk of
being held to have abused its discretion, be required in every
such instance during the trial to conduct a separate inquiry?
It is difficult to conceive of circumstances where, its timeliness and solidity having been shown, it would not be the
trial judge's duty to hold such inquiry the first-and possibly the second-time that objection was made. But what
if these allegations prove to be groundless and the accused
continue to "cry wolf" and demand to be heard in further
time-consuming collateral investigations?
As pointed out by Judge Chase in United States v. Krulewitch,30 " .. . if the time and continuity factors were wholly
disregarded, the disruptions . . . might well as a practical
matter end only when the ingenuity and perseverance of
28.

29.

As generally stated, the test is that the defendant's tort must
have been a substantial factor in causing the injury. Its origin
is said to be found in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M.
R. Co., 146 Minn. 340, 179 N. W. 45 (1920), though it may date
back to an article by Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25
HARV. L. Rnv. 103, 223, 229, 230 (1911). See Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REv. 19 (1936).
The problem of "attenuation" treated in this paragraph should
be clearly distinguished from the requirement previously discussed, that the accused must convince the trial judge of the
"solidity" of his claim. The trial court may be convinced that
defendant's objection is sufficiently "solid"

30.

(that is, plausible or

probable) to warrant further inquiry. Yet the prosecution may
prevail by proving either that there is no causal connection or
that any such connection has become too attenuated to be legally
significant.
167 F.2d 943, 946 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
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counsel for the defendant had been exhausted." In view of
this consideration and in view of the emphasis put upon
the breadth of the trial court's discretion in the second Nardone case, it would not seem that an appellate court should
hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing
additional interruptions which previous experience indicated
would be unfounded. And this result would be defensible
even though in a particular instance it could be shown that
the defendant did have a valid objection. By making frivolous use of devices designed in part for his protection it
may well be contended that he has waived their further pro31
tection.
In evaluating the procedures and practices as developed
herein, especially with reference to the problem of burden
of proof, it is necessary to look briefly to the policy behind
the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence. Such evidence
is excluded in order to discourage the resort to illegal acts
on the part of law enforcement officers and to free the
courts from a stigma of duplicity in giving indirect sanction to such acts. 3 2 To the extent to which they exclude
such evidence the courts which follow the rule have allowed
these considerations to override the conflicting policy demand
for detection and punishment of crime. 33 But there is no
reason or desire to go further and prevent the punishment of
31.

This result does not seem overly harsh in view of the fact that
the rule against illegally obtained evidence is not based upon a
contention that it is unreliable. See Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U. S.338, 341 (1939); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2183; Atkinson, supra note 1, at 12, 13.
32. Possibly the reason most frequently assigned for the rule is that
it is thought to have a deterrent effect on law enforcement officers. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886); Bronaugh,
Tainted Evidence, 31 LAW NoTEs 188 (1928).
In their zeal to
convict criminals they also violate the law, it is said, thus bringing the Government into disrepute and causing it to set altogether
the wrong type of example. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383 (1914); Arnold, supra note 6. ". . . for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928).
33. See ibid; Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 694, 695
(App. D. C. 1940); Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 349
(1939) ; Atkinson, supra note 1, at 26. But see 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2184.
Professor Wigmore is violently opposed to the rule,
characterizing the forces leading to it as "misplaced sentimentality."

254
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a criminal if he can be convicted by legally obtained and competent evidence24
In the light of these contesting public interests it is
believed that the practices of the federal courts as here
interpreted are essentially fair and workable and merit being followed by the various state courts which have adopted
the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence. To hold that
the employment of illegal means by the prosecution to secure
evidence makes the balance of its case prima facie inadmissible upon objection by the accused, would certainly discourage the use of such means. But it would also place a
well-nigh intolerable handicap upon the prosecution in presenting the legally obtained and competent portion of its
case. To require (and allow) the defense to support its
objection by showing its timeliness3 5 and substantiality
would mitigate the handicap and at the same time give ample
regard to the policy behind the rule of exclusion. The accused having passed these initial hurdles it does not seem
unreasonable to require the prosecution to proceed with the
evidence or, at most, to produce a preponderance of the evidence.386 Such procedure, administered within the bounds
of the sound discretion of the trial judge, seems to strike a
fair balance between the conflicting public interests involved.
34.
35.

8 id. § 2184a.
The burden of showing timeliness would range from light to nonexistent in those states tending to the view that a motion to suppress evidence directly obtained by illegal means is sufficiently
timely though first made at trial. See note 6 supra.

36.

" . . . this should be the rule in analogy to the well settled doc-

trine in civil cases that a wrongdoer who has mingled the consequences of lawful and unlawful conduct, has the burden of disentangling them and must bear the prejudice of his failure to do
so. . . . To impose the duty on the prosecution is particularly
appropriate here, for it necessarily has full knowledge of just

how its case has been prepared. . .

."

United States v. Goldstein,

120 F.2d 485, 488 (C. C. A. 2d 1941). See Murphy, J., dissenting
in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114, 124, n. 1 (1942).

